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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This is an appeal from a judgment and order of the Second
District Court, the Honorable Parley R. Baldwin presiding, dated
July 13, 1998.

Record (hereinafter "R") at 119.

The court

entered its judgment and order following the trial de novo of an
informal adjudicative proceeding before the Utah Department of
Human Services.

The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant

to Section 78-2a-3(2)(a), Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether the district court erred as a matter of law in
concluding that the statute in question, Utah Code Annot. § 35A1-502, as applied to Burgandy, did not chill or burden Burgandy's
due process right to a pretermination hearing and, therefore, was
constitutional under Article I, Section 11 of the Utah
Constitution.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court's conclusion of law is reviewed for
correctness. Park City Mines Co. V. Greater Park City Co., 870
P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993); no particular deference is given to a
trial court's ruling on a question of law.
P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).

State v. Pena, 869

The ordinary presumption of

constitutionality of the statute in question, Utah Code Annot. §
35A-1-502, does not apply, since the right impaired is an
important constitutionally based personal right, warranting a
heightened level of review.

Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357,

1365 (Utah App. 1993). See discussion infra, at 12.
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES
ORDINANCES AND RULES
Utah Constitution, Article I f Section 11
United States Constitution, Amendments Five and Fourteen
Utah Code Annot. § 35A-1-502
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This case challenges on constitutional grounds the recovery

of $726, representing General Assistance (GA) paid to Burgandy
while a decision on his request for a pretermination hearing was
pending.

At the trial level, the parties stipulated to the

material facts.

The only issue considered was Burgandy1s

argument that the statute, Utah Code Annot. § 35A-1-502, which
allows the state of Utah to recover overpayments caused by
mistake, administrative error or fraud, should not be construed
as allowing recovery of an overpayment that results from the
exercise of a pretermination hearing right.

Burgandy maintains

that to allow recovery under these circumstances chills or
burdens a GA recipient's right of access to the courts, thereby
violating the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution,
Article I f Section 11.
B.

Course of Proceedings
Burgandy filed his complaint in the second district court on

June 6, 1997, seeking de novo review of the Findings and Order of
the Office of Administrative Hearings, Department of Human

2

Services, issued May 8, 1997.

R-5.

After stipulating to the

material facts, the parties briefed the legal issue and appeared
before the Honorable Parley R. Baldwin on December 18, 1997 for
oral argument.

R-96.

On March 27, 1998, a memorandum decision

was issued, affirming the action of the administrative agency.
R-119.

On July 14, 1998, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

and a Judgment and Order were entered.
followed on July 27, 1998.
C.

R-125.

This appeal

R-144.

Disposition in the Court Below
The second district court affirmed the agency decision and

upheld an overpayment of $726.00.
D.

Statement of the Facts
In May 1994, Burgandy was fifty-six

years of age and

suffering from physical and mental impairments.

R-100.

At

that time, he was determined unemployable by the Ogden office of
the Department of Human Services and began receiving financial
assistance of $241 per month under the General Assistance
Program.

R-39.

On June 7, 1994, while receiving GA benefits,

Burgandy applied for disability benefits under the federal Social
Security and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs.

R-39.

On July 21, 1994, Burgandy received notice from the state of
Utah that he was no longer considered unemployable and his GA
would terminate July 31, 1994.

R-39.

At the time he received

the notice that his GA would be terminated, Burgandy was
homeless, unable to work and had no savings, assets or other
means of supporting himself.

R-100.
3

Believing that he was

unemployable, Burgandy requested a hearing and further requested
that his GA benefits be continued while his hearing request was
pending.

R-39.

Burgandy was advised in the hearing request form

that: "If the hearing decision supports the agency action and you
are not successful in any further appeal of that decision, you
may have an overpayment if you receive continued or reinstated
benefits.

You will have to pay back any overpayment."

R-43.

Burgandy's benefits continued through the month of his hearing
decision, October 1994.

R-39, 51.

On August 16, 1994, a hearing was held and Burgandy appeared
and testified.

R-39.

On October 6, 1994, the hearing officer

issued a decision upholding the closure of Burgandy1s GA case.
R-39.

Burgandy requested review of that decision.

R-40.

Burgandy subsequently reapplied for GAf was found eligible and
continued to receive benefits until his Social Security
disability was established.

R-101.

On April 1, 1995, the state of Utah, Office of Recovery
Services served Burgandy with a Notice of Agency Action:
Overpayment Determination (NAA:OD), alleging an overpayment of
$726.00, representing the GA benefits paid to him while his
hearing was pending.

R-40, 51.

On April 6, 1995, Burgandy

requested a hearing on the alleged overpayment.

R-40.

The

parties subsequently stipulated to hold the hearing in abeyance,
pending a decision on Burgandy's appeal of the fair hearing
decision.

R-40.

On July 20, 1995, the Social Security Administration found
4

Burgandy disabled since September 1993 and awarded him benefits
under the SSDI and SSI programs.

R-40.

On November 12, 1996, the Director of the Office of
Administrative Hearings affirmed the fair hearing decision which
had found Burgandy ineligible for GA benefits.

R-40, 60.

Burgandy did not seek further review of this decision.
On March 10f 1997f a hearing was held before an
Administrative Law Judge on the alleged GA overpayment.

R-41. On

May 8, 1997, the Administrative Law Judge issued a decision
upholding the overpayment but declining to consider Burgandy's
argument that recovery of the overpayment was constitutionally
barred.

R-41, 68.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Burgandy's right to a pretermination hearing is a
fundamental right under the federal constitution, entitled to the
highest protection.

That right is infringed by the state's

reliance on Utah Code Annot. § 35A-1-502 to recover the amount of
GA benefits paid to Burgandy while his request for a hearing was
pending.

The threat of recovery of an overpayment under these

circumstances chills or burdens Burgandy's right to a due process
hearing and is, therefore, violative of the open courts
provision, Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution.
court should apply a heightened level of review and find the
statute as applied unconstitutional.

5

The

ARGUMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
A.

General Assistance and The Recovery of Overpayments
General Assistance is a state-funded program which provides

benefits to unemployable persons who are ineligible for cash
assistance under other state or federal programs.
Annot. § 35A-3-401.

Utah Code

GA is typically paid to those Utahns who are

temporarily unemployable or who are awaiting a determination of
eligibility for federal SSI disability benefits.

Standards for

determining unemployability are established by the Department of
Workforce Services, previously known as the Department of Human
Services.

At the time this case arose, a claimant for GA was

required to have a physical or mental impairment, expected to
last 30 days, and:
so severe that the person cannot do his
previous work. In addition, he could not
reasonably hope to find any other kind of
"substantial work1 considering his age,
education and work experience. "Substantial
work1 is work which pays $500 or more a
month.
UTAH-DHS-OFS Vol. II § 362-4.

See Addendum.

The same state policies establishing the standard for GA
provide that the claimant "has a legal right to ask for a hearing
any time he does not agree with an action on his case."
DHS-OFS Vol. II § 190.

UTAH-

The policy goes on to direct the

caseworker, in cases wherein a recipient is entitled to advance
notice, to "continue the financial assistance if the client asked
for the hearing anytime before the effective date of the action
6

or within 10 days of the notice mail date."
The policy specifically provides that

Id., at § 190-2.

lf

[t]he client is not

entitled to continued assistance pending any appeal of the
initial hearing decision."

Jd.

See Addendum.

The same policies give direction regarding the assessment of
overpayments for incorrect payments.

UTAH-DHS-OFS Vol. II § 840.

The policy divides incorrect payments into three categories:
1. Administrative error—mistakes made by
state or local office staff in computing
payments or eligibility;
2. Inadvertent error—mistakes made by the
client or his representative that are not
intended; and
3. Intentional violation—deliberate
breaches of program rules by the client or
his representative.
See Addendum.

The policy makes no reference to incorrect

payments resulting from continued assistance while a hearing is
pending.
The recovery of GA benefits paid during the pendency of a
hearing request is not the typical overpayment contemplated by
state policy.

The Notice of Agency Action served on Burgandy to

notify him of the state's intent to recover an overpayment
references only the three traditional types of incorrect payments
identified in state policy.

It alleges, in part:

The State of Utah is entitled to recover all
overpayments of public assistance whether due
to fraud, mistake, or administrative error
under Sections 62A-9-129 and 62A-11-201 et
seq., U.C.A. 1953. (emphasis added)
R-51.

Neverthelessf the term "overpayment" is defined broadly

7

enough by state statute to include the GA benefits paid to
Burgandy pending his hearing.

Section 62A-9-129, which has been

redesignated as Utah Code Annot. § 35A-1-502, provides:
"Overpayment1 means money, public assistance,
or any other thing of value provided under a
state or federally funded benefit program to
the extent that the person receiving the
thing of value is not entitled to receive it
or is not entitled to receive it at the level
provided.
Utah Code Annot. § 35A-1-502(1)(b)(i). Further:
Each providerf client, or other person
who receives an overpayment shall, regardless
of fault, return the overpayment or repay its
value to the department immediately...
Utah Code Annot. § 35A-1-502(2).

The Administrative Law Judge

who heard Burgandy1s case also found that the federal regulations
at 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(4)(i)(B) had been incorporated into the
GA policiesf thereby establishing a further category of
overpayment.

R-69.

The language of the statute is broad enough

to encompass an overpayment that accrues during the pendency of a
hearing; nevertheless, it appears safe to say that neither the
legislature nor the Department of Human Services ever considered
whether the statute so applied might infringe on a GA recipient's
constitutional rights.
II. RECOVERY OF AN OVERPAYMENT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS
CASE IS BARRED BY ARTICLE I, SECTION 11 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
A.

A GA Recipient's Right to a Pretermination Hearing Is a
Fundamental Right Entitled To The Highest Protection
The state's action of recovering GA paid to a recipient

8

while a hearing determination is pending implicates a fundamental
right: the right of a GA recipient to a pretermination hearing, A
fundamental right does not mean a right of particular human or
social significance.

San Antonio School District v. Rodriguezf

411 U.S. 1, 33, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1298, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16 (1973).

A

fundamental right has its source, explicitly or implicitly, in
the Constitution.

Plyler v. Doer 457 U.S. 202, 217, n. 15, 102

S.Ct. 2382, 2395, n. 15, 72 L.Ed. 2d 786 (1982).
Almost thirty years ago in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
261, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287, 90 S.Ct. 1011 (1970), the Supreme Court
held due process required that recipients of state-funded general
assistance be given an evidentiary hearing before termination of
their welfare benefits.
fundamental right.

The state of Utah does not question this

Its policies and procedures presume the right

of a GA recipient to a due process hearing before benefits may be
terminated.
The fundamental right of a GA recipient to a due process
pretermination hearing is entitled to the highest protection,
since it directly affects access to the courts.

The United

States Supreme Court has described the right of access to the
courts as "one aspect of the right of petition."

California

Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510, 92
S.Ct. 609, 611, 30 L.Ed. 2d 642 (1972).

The Court has described

the right to petition as "among the most precious of the
liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights."

United Mine

Workers v. Illinois State Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217, 222, 88
9

S.Ct. 353, 356, 19 L.Ed. 2d 426 (1967).
B.

The Open Courts Provision
Access to the courts is so highly regarded that the framers

of the Utah Constitution preserved it with the following
language:
All courts shall be open, and every
person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary
delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal
in this State, by himself or counsel, any
civil cause to which he is a party.
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11.

Such a provision,

often referred to as an "open courts" clause or "remedies"
clause, is found in thirty-seven state constitutions.

Berry By

And Through Berry v. Beech Aircraft. 717 P.2d 670, 674 (Utah
1985).

The Kansas Supreme Court described its open courts

provision as "one of the most sacred and essential constitutional
guarantees."

State ex. rel. Stephen v. O'Keefe, 686 P.2d 171,

178 (Kan. 1984), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 1088 (1984).
The right of access to the courts applies also to
administrative proceedings, including commissions, boards and
bureaus.

State ex. rel. Stephen v. O'Keefe, 686 P.2d at 178.

A GA recipient's access to the courts begins at the
administrative level, since administrative remedies must first be
exhausted before review in district court may be sought.
Code Annot. § 63-46b-15.
A GA recipient's right of access to the courts is not
10

Utah

affected when the state exercises the authority of the statute to
recover a typical overpayment caused by fraud, mistake or
administrative error; such proceedings are not questioned by this
appeal.

Overpayments caused by fraud, mistake or administrative

error do occur and the statute in question, Utah Code Annot. §
35A-1-502, represents a proper function of the legislative branch
of government to recover them.

It is the chilling effect on a GA

recipient's right to a pretermination hearing by the threatened
use of the statute to recover benefits paid while the hearing is
pending that is the concern of this appeal.
The open courts provision should be applied broadly so as to
prevent such a chilling effect.

A consistent line of Supreme

Court holdings supports this position.

Thus, the Court in Berry

declared:
A plain reading of section 11 also
establishes that the framers of the
Constitution intended that an individual
could not be arbitrarily deprived of
effective remedies designed to protect basic
individual rights. A constitutional
guarantee of access to the courthouse was not
intended by the founders to be an empty
gesture; individuals are also entitled to a
remedy by "due course of law' for injuries to
"person, property, or reputation.'
Berry, 717 P.2d at 675.
Utah appellate decisions support the argument that GA
recipients are especially entitled to protection under the open
courts provision.

The Supreme Court in Berry observed that while

the legislature has great latitude in defining, changing and
modernizing the law:
11

Nevertheless, the basic purpose of Article
I, section 11 is to impose some limitation
on that power for the benefit of those
persons who are injured in their persons,
property, or reputations since they are
generally isolated in society, belong to no
identifiable group, and rarely are able to
rally the political process to their aid.
Berryf 717 P.2d at 676.

Justice Zimmerman, in a concurring

opinion in Condemarin v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 367
(Utah 1989) reiterated the Court's view that Article I, Section
11 protects the rights of citizens unable to obtain a remedy
through the normal political process.

This court, in Currier v.

Holden, 862 P.2d at 1361, held the right to petition for habeus
corpus to be "a basic individual right and prisoners constitute a
group needing protection because they are isolated in society and
lack political influence."
There can be little argument that GA recipients are a
similarly situated group of citizens, generally isolated in
society, and lacking the ability to pursue a remedy through the
normal political process.

At the time he requested a hearing and

continuing benefits, Burgandy was disabled, homeless and lacking
both income and resources.

R-100.

As a group, GA recipients fit

the definition of citizens whose claims for relief merit review
under the open courts provision.
C.

A Heightened Level of Review Is Appropriate
Analysis of the challenged statute should be made utilizing

a heightened standard of review.

While generally a statute is

entitled to a presumption of constitutional validity, this court
has held that when a civil remedy protected under Article I,
Section 11 of the Utah Constitution is involved, the usual
12

presumption of validity does not control.
P.2d at 1362.

Currier v. Holden, 862

The court noted that a majority of the Utah

Supreme Court had agreed in Condemarin that a heightened level of
review was implicated but felt compelled by an analytical
disagreement among the justices to examine two additional
criteria: (1) the degree to which a statute impairs an
individual's right to seek remedy, and (2) the nature of the
right impaired.

Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d at 1362-63.

Case law supports the conclusion that the degree of
impairment need be very little, when the right affected is
something as sacred as access to the courts.

In Silver v.

Cormier, 529 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1976) the court, in analyzing
the right of access to the courts under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution, held that the
degree of impairment need be very slight to constitute a
violation of a person's civil rights.

The plaintiffs in Silver

brought suit against an urban renewal authority relocation
officer who threatened to withhold $10,000 in money owing to
plaintiffs, should they file a lawsuit to challenge the fairness
of a property sale.

In finding that plaintiffs had a valid

claim, the court held:
Defendant contends that a threat to
withhold legally required payments if a
person exercises his right of access to the
courts does not constitute a violation of
constitutional rights and thus the court
erred in not granting his motion to dismiss
this action. Access to the courts of the
United States is a constitutional right
guaranteed by the due process clauses of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments. (citations
omitted) This right of access to the courts
cannot be infringed upon or burdened. Adams
13

v, Carlson, 7 Cir., 488 F.2d 619, 630. A
public official's threats to a citizen to
withhold monies due and owing, should legal
proceedings on an independent matter be
instituted, burdens or chills constitutional
rights of access to the courts. And this is
true although the threat is not actually
effective.
Silver v. Cormier, 529 F.2d at 163.

By analogy to this case, a

threat to a GA recipient to recover continued benefits as an
overpayment is a significant burden or chilling of a
constitutional right, even though the GA recipient is undeterred
by the threat and requests a hearing.
The fact that the denial of Burgandy's GA benefits was
upheld after administrative review (R-60) does not diminish the
degree of impairment.

Relying on Silver v. Cormierr the court in

McCoy v. Golden, 598 F.Supp. 310, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) held that
mechanics were denied their right of access to the courts by an
agreement which required recoupment of a portion of wages
previously paid and a waiver of their right to litigate the terms
of the agreement.

The court opined:

Contrary to defendants' assertion, plaintiff
need not prove that plaintiffs had a right to
the 1978-1982 wage rates or back pay set
forth in the April 1982 wage agreement in
order to claim that their right to access was
unduly burdened. v[E]ven though a person has
no "right' to a valuable government benefit
and even though the government may deny him
the benefit for any number of reasons, there
are some reasons upon which the government
may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a
person on a basis that infringes his
constitutionally protected interests ....'
Perry v. Sindermann. 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92
S.Ct. 2694, 2697, 33 L.Ed. 2d 570 (1972).
Thus, the fact that plaintiffs were not
14

"entitled to the benefits does not in and of
itself defeat their constitutional claim.
See Northern Pennsylvania Legal Svcs., Inc.
V. County of Lackawanaf 513 F.Supp. 678
(M.D.Pa. 1981).
McCoy v. Goldinf 598 F.Supp. at 315.

Applying this reasoning to

Burgandy's case, the state may not deny him GA benefits while his
request for a hearing is pending, if doing so infringes on his
protected constitutional right to a pretermination hearing.

The

fact that he might not be entitled to the benefits is not
determinative.
The degree of impairment of the right in question need not
be total, for a statute to receive heightened review under the
open courts provision.

The statutes reviewed by this court in

Currier and the Supreme Court in Berry did not cut off causes of
action entirely, but did impose significant limitations.
Similarly, in this case, the right to a pretermination hearing is
not eliminated but is impaired to a significant degree.

The

trial court acknowledges that the statute, interpreted to permit
recovery of all overpayments incurred while a hearing is pending,
does deter some GA recipients from requesting a hearing.

The

trial court reasoned:
If the petitioner where [sic] to prevail in
his arguments all general assistance
recipients who received notice to terminate
their assistance, whether or not they felt
they were wronged would be inclined to
immediately access the courts, first through
an administrative hearing, knowing that their
assistance would continue during that hearing
process.
R-120.

Implicit in the court's reasoning is the assumption that
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the statute does chill the right of some GA recipients to a due
process hearing.

Since there is no means of determining merit

prior to a pretermination hearing, the chilling effect likely
impedes access to the courts by both meritorious and
nonmeritorious claimants.

The United States Supreme Court in

Goldberg v. Kelly did not distinguish between recipients with
meritorious cases and those without.

The deterrence of even a

small number of GA recipients is a sufficient degree of
impairment for satisfying the first criteria identified in
Currier.
The court in Currier does not say whether equal weight
should be given to each criteriaf or whether the degree of
impairment might be less in some cases, depending upon the nature
of the right affected.

It is reasonable to conclude that the two

criteria must be considered together, with a lesser degree of
impairment required, when an important individual right is at
stake.

Under such an approach, stricter scrutiny would be given

when a basic individual right, such as a right found in the
federal constitution, is impaired than, for example, when
impairment of a commercial right is involved.
The conclusion that the court should employ a heightened
level of review is strengthened by consideration of the nature of
the right impaired.

In Currier, the court noted that

"[g]enerally, "a court will exercise stricter scrutiny in
evaluating measures that encroach upon civil liberties than it
will with respect to statutes that impact what can be
16

characterized as only economic interests. "' Currier, 862 P.2d at
1364 quoting In re Criminal Investigationf 7th Dist. Ct. f 754
P.2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988)(citing Allen v. Trueman, 100 Utah 36,
57, 110 P.2d 355, 365 (1941)(Wolfe,J., concurring)).

The court

observed that the Utah Supreme Court has reached a similar
conclusion that legislation impairing rights specifically
protected by the federal constitution requires a higher level of
review.

Currier, 862 P.2d at 1364.

The court in Currier

concluded that a statute impairing the right to petition for
habeus corpus required the application of heightened scrutiny
when analyzed under the open courts provision.
The appeal in this case also involves a right protected
under the federal constitution—the right to a pretermination
hearing.

It is a highly valuable right for GA recipients, since

they are often wholly dependent on meager benefits to meet the
cost of surviving.

Receiving GA benefits, without interruption,

while trying to establish SSI eligibility can mean the difference
between homelessness and continued residence in some type of
housing; it can be the difference between having food at the end
of the month when Food Stamps run out and going hungry; it can
mean the difference between medical treatment and going without.
The nature of the right impaired by the statute as applied
compels a heightened level of scrutiny in this appeal.

The

reasoning in Silver v. Cormier can be readily applied by analogy
to this case.

The threat of having to pay back benefits is as

real a burden on a GA recipient's civil rights as the threat to
17

withhold payment of money.

The right of access to the courts,

whether it be analyzed under Article I, Section 11 of the Utah
Constitution or under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitutionf is of the highest order; any
impairment thereof deserves the highest level of review.

See

Cummings v. X-Ray Associates of N.M., 918 P.2d 1321, 1331 (N.M.
1996)(Strict scrutiny is applied, when the right sought to be
vindicated by access to the courts is a fundamental right).
D.

The Statute Fails The Berry Reasonableness Test
Review of a statute under the open courts provision is a

balanced analysis, involving a consideration of reasonable
remedies for wrongs suffered.

Thus, the Court in Berry declared:

We hold that section 11 of the
Declaration of Rights and the prerogative of
the legislature are properly accommodated by
applying a two-part analysis. First, section
11 is satisfied if the law provides an
injured person an effective and reasonable
alternative remedy "by the course of law" for
vindication of his constitutional interest.
The benefit provided by the substitute must
be substantially equal in value or other
benefit to the remedy abrogated in providing
essentially comparable substantive protection
to one's person, property or reputation,
although the form of the substitute remedy
may be different. (citations omitted)
Berry, 717 P.2d at 680.
There is no adequate substitute for a pretermination
hearing, when a person is receiving GA benefits.

It is only

through a hearing before an impartial hearing officer that a GA
recipient can hope to have his rights properly determined.

There

is no other provision in the law for determining a GA recipient's
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rights to benefits.

Moreover, a hearing is the recipient's

entrance to the court system.
The Court went on to hold:
Second, if there is no substitute or
alternative remedy provided, abrogation of
the remedy or cause of action may be
justified only if there is a clear social or
economic evil to be eliminated and the
elimination of an existing legal remedy is
not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for
achieving the objective, (citations omitted)
Berry, 717 P.2d at 680.
There is no clear social or economic evil that must be
eliminated by the statute at issue in this appeal.

The statute

serves its purpose by authorizing the recovery of overpayments
caused by administrative error, mistake or fraud.

Clearly, a

proper social good is served by recovering overpayments resulting
from such causes.

But a distinction has to be made when the

overpayment results from the exercise of an important individual
right.

Rather than eliminating a social evil, the statute, when

interpreted to include the type of ovepayment at issue in this
appeal, creates its own evil by chilling a GA recipient's right
to a hearing.
There is no clear economic evil to be eliminated by
interpreting the statute to allow recovery of the type of
ovepayment Burgandy incurred.

The number of GA recipients is

small and the number who request pretermination hearings with
continued benefits even smaller.

The period of time during which

continued benefits are paid is usually short, since a hearing is
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normally held within a few weeks of being requested.

The time

periods and amount of benefits paid in Burgandy's case are
typical.

Burgandy requested a hearing on August lf 1994 and

received a hearing on August 16th.

A decision was issued October

6, 1994, resulting in a three-month overpayment of $726.00.
As discussed previously, the only objective identified by
the trial court for justifying application of the statute to
allow recovery of benefits received by GA recipients while a
hearing is pending is that it will deter those lacking
meritorious cases.

The unreasonableness and arbitrariness of

this objective inheres in the fact that there is no mechanism
for determining which GA recipients have good cases, and should
be continued on GA, and which deserve to be terminated.

The

only fair way such a determination can be made is by permitting
a hearing.

However, the unrepresented, uneducated GA recipient

is not capable of making an accurate assessment of the merits of
his case and may choose to forego a hearing, rather than take
the chance of having to repay what for him is a sizable
overpayment.
If deterring frivolous appeals is the state's objective, an
alternative exists for making that objective more reasonable.
The hearing officer who renders the decision after the
pretermination hearing could simply include a finding whether
the person requesting a hearing did so in good faith and with
reasonable probability of success.

If a finding is made that

the appeal lacked merit or was brought in bad faith, then the
20

state would be free to pursue recovery of an overpayment.
The concept underlying this more reasonable alternative has
a solid basis in law.

The Social Security Act ameliorates some

of the harshness of overpayment recovery by allowing waiver of
the overpayment, when it is shown that the recipient was not at
fault in causing the overpayment and recovery would defeat the
purpose of the Social Security Act or be against equity and good
conscience.

42 U.S.C. §§ 1383(b)(B); 404(b); 20 C.F.R. §§

416.550 et. seq..

Under this authority, the Social Security

Administration has waived overpayments incurred by SSI
recipients while a pretermination hearing was pending.
In the case of Arthur Va (May 21, 1979), the Social
Security Administration Appeals Council reversed an
Administrative Law Judge who had found Va at fault in causing
his overpayment.

See Addendum.

Va had been receiving SSI in

November 1975 when he received notice that his benefits would
end in January 1976.

Va appealed and received continued

benefits while his appeal was pending.

Va's cessation of

benefits was upheld and he did not seek further review.
received notice of a $5139.50 overpayment.

Va then

Va's request for a

waiver was denied by an ALJ who reasoned Va knew he might have
to repay the benefits, if he lost the appeal and, irrespective
of his own opinion about his disability, knew he was receiving
benefits under the risk of repayment.

In reversing the ALJ and

granting the waiver, the Appeals Council stated:
[W]here an overpayment occurs as the result
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of the continuation of payment provisions of
section 416.1336(c), a finding of without
fault may still be made if there is no
evidence establishing that the recipient did
not believe he properly deserved the
incorrect payment. The mere fact that a
claimant signed a statement acknowledging
possible liability for overpayment would not
be dispositive of the issue.
In the instant case, the entire overpayment
resulted from the continuation of payment
provisions exercised by the claimant as his
due process right under the regulations.
Although the claimant may well have
understood that the Administration no longer
considered him disabled and that he could
ultimately lose on appeal, it is evident
from the record that he honestly believed he
was disabled and properly deserved the
payments made after January 1976.
Therefore, the mere fact that a claimant
realizes he received an adverse disability
determination and that he might ultimately
lose his appeal and be overpaid is not
determinative of the without fault issue.
The key factor is the claimant's belief that
he was disabled and that he properly
deserved the payment.
In the case of Arthur Va f at 3.
J. Wright (March 16, 1979).

See also, In the case of Billie

Addendum.

The principle that only those who pursue a legal remedy in
bad faith deserve sanction is found elsewhere in the civil law.
Courts may award attorney fees against a litigant when the
action brought was "without merit and not brought or asserted in
good faith..."

Utah Code Annot. § 78-27-56 (1988).

Rule 11 of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to sanction an
attorney or unrepresented party for making a frivolous claim.
The same is true under the federal rules, at both the trial and
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appellate levels.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; Fed R. App. P. 38.

Under

the Equal Access to Justice Act f the government may be required
to pay the prevailing party's fees and costs, unless its
position was substantially justified.

28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1985).

Case law from the state of Washington further illustrates
this principle.

In Carter v. The University of Washingtonf 536

P.2d 618 (Wash. 1975), the Court reviewed a statute requiring
the posting of an appeal bond for review of an administrative
decision.

The Court observed that bond requirements are

"fraught with the same defect as are filing fees, viz., they
deter the pursuit of meritorious claims in the appellate
courts."

.Id., at 624.

Less onerous methods are available, the

Court concluded, including a showing of "(1) bona fide indigency
and (2) probable merit to the claim."

Idw

at

624.

This review demonstrates that reasonable methods for
distinguishing between meritorious and frivolous claims can be
crafted.

Other institutions have done so in the interest of

fairness to individuals who choose to exercise their due process
rights.

The fact that the Social Security Administration, one

of the largest public welfare institutions in the world, has
deemed it appropriate to sanction only bad faith appellants
lends credibility to the argument that Utah's recovery of
overpayments from all GA appellants, regardless of merit, is
inherently unreasonable.
Under this suggested approach, Burgandy's appeal was
brought in good faith.

At the time he requested a
23

pretermination hearing, Burgandy believed he was disabled and
entitled to GA benefits.

R-101.

Shortly after his hearing

decision was issued, Burgandy reapplied and was again found
eligible for GA.

R-101.

The Social Security Administration,

using a disability standard more stringent than that applied in
GA cases1, found Burgandy eligible for disability back to 1993.
R-40.

The fact that Burgandy was advised when he requested a

hearing that, in the event he was unsuccessful, he might have an
overpayment is not determinative.

The determinative issue is

whether he requested review in good faith, believing himself to
still be eligible for GA.

Given the facts established, the more

reasonable policy outlined above would have directed the state
to decline recovery of an overpayment in Burgandy's case.
State officials may not take retaliatory action against a
person in a way which intimidates or chills that person's right
to exercise a constitutional right to seek judicial relief.
Harrison v. Springdale Water & Sewer Com'nf 780 F.2d 1422, 1427
(8th Cir. 1986).

Burgandy does not argue that the state's

action in this case was retaliatory but the effect is the same.
The possibility of having to repay GA benefits effectively
chills or intimidates some of Utah's most vulnerable citizens
from exercising a fundamental right.

lr

That effect can only be

The definition of disability for SSI and Disability Insurance purposes includes a
requirement that the disabling condition have lasted or be expected to last twelve months or end
in death. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505; 416.905 (1998). The GA standard only requires that the
condition causing unemployability be expected to last thirty days. UTAH-DHS-OFS Vol. II §
362-4. See Addendum.
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eliminated by finding Section 35A-1-502 unconstitutional as
applied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed hereinf the court should reverse
the trial court's decision.

The court should direct that

summary judgment be entered in favor of Burgandy and that the
administrative decision awarding an overpayment of $726.00 be
.j

reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this c> /

' day of November, 1998.

Michael E. Bulson
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that two true and correct
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed this ,3/
day of November, 1998, via first class mail, postage prepaid, to
the following:
Ann Rozycki
Assistant Attorney General
515 East 100 South, Eighth Floor
P.O. Box 140835
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0835

J?^^s

lichael E. Bulson
Attorney for Appellant
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IN THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT

T. TRON BURGUNDY,
a.k.a. Ronald G. Smith,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Honorable Parley R. Baldwin

Plaintiff(s),
Case No. 970903742 AA
vs.
STATE OF UTAH,
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
SERVICES,

m^ *

Defendant(s).

For purpose of the ruling in this matter, the court accepts the stipulated facts as set out in
the trial memorandum and will not recite them in this opinion. Further, the court recognizes the
substantial amount of briefing by the parties in preparing exceptional memorandum for the court.
The court has reviewed in detail the cites and memorandum, but in an attempt to render a
decision timely, the court will forgo reciting the specific cases, acknowledging that the findings
and conclusions are reached from its determination of the applicable law cited by the parties.
The issue before this court is whether the statute allowing recovery of overpayments for
financial assistance is unconstitutional as it applies to the petitioner who was paid general
assistance benefits during the pendency of his request for an administrative hearing.
Its clear that the petitioner was notified of the decision to terminate his benefits, that he
requested a hearing and elected to have the general assistance continue until after there was a
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Burgundy v State
970903742 AA
Page Two
hearing decision. He was aware that if the decision after hearing was against him, that he would
subsequently be responsible for the overpayment.
It is clear that financial impediment to access to the courts are disfavored. Cases
involving filing fees and costs have been found to violate due process. Petitioner argues that a
chilling effect has taken place because of the required overpayment he is required to repay in
accordance with the state statues. The law as it stands rehires the re-payment of the general
assistance paid to the petitioner during the hearing process if he is unsuccessful at his hearing.
Petitioner argues that to require him to reimburse the state discourages petitioner and others in
his position from pursuing an appeal and create a barrier to his right to access the courts.
This court disagrees. There is no chilling effect on the right to access the courts nor a
barrier. If the petitioner where to prevail in his arguments all general assistance recipients who
received notice to terminate their assistance, whether or not they felt they were wronged would
be inclined to immediately access the courts, first through an administrative hearing, knowing
that their assistance would continue during that hearing process. Petitioner clearly has the right
to access and can keep his assistance or access without continuing his assistance. There need not
be a guarantee of his desired outcome from the hearing. His right to due process is not inhibited
but actually encouraged. Petitioner has the opportunity to contest his termination. If he is
unsuccessful and has elected to continues general assistance as he did in this case, then by
statute, which this court concludes is constitutional, he is require to repay those funds received.
In the opinion of this court the case law supports this conclusion.
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Burgundy v State
970903742 AA
Page
Three
*o
w

This court grants summary judgment to the respondent and requires the payment by the
petitioner of sum of $726.00 of general assistance monies he elected to receivefromAugust
through October 1994 when he requested a fair hear on the decision to terminate and elected to
receive benefits during the pendency of his initial appeal. The agency action is affirmed. The
attorney for the respondent is to prepare the appropriatefindings,conclusions and judgments.
DATED this

£ 5

day of March, 1998.

PARLEY R. BALDWIN
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Burgundy v State
970903742 AA
Page Four

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing decision was mailed, firstclass, postage prepaid, on this
day of March, 1998, to the following:
Michael E. Bulson, Esq.
Attorney for Petitioner
550 24th Street, Suite 300
Ogden, Utah 84401
Frank D. Mylar, Esq.
Attorney for Respondent
515 East 100 South
P. O. Box 1980
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-1980

In-Court Clerk
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Stephanie M. Saperstein (#5541)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (#1231)
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for the State of Utah
515 East 100 South, Eighth Floor
P.O. Box 140835
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0835
Telephone: (801) 536-8358
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
T. TRON BURGUNDY aka Ronald
G. Smith
Petitioner,

)
)
JUDGMENT AND
ORDER

\

v.
STATE OF UTAH, Department
of Human Services, Office of
Recovery Services

1

Case No. 970903742AA

)

Judge Parley R. Baldwin

Respondent.

The foregoing matter came before the court for trial on
December 18, 1997 on Petitioner's complaint for de novo review of
the Findings and Order issued by the Department of Human
Services, Office of Administrative Hearings on May 8, 1997.
Honorable Parley R. Baldwin presided.

The

Tne petitioner, T. Tron

Burgundy was represented by Michael E. Bulson.

The Respondent

State of Utah was represented by Frank D. Mylar, Assistant
Attorney General.
The Court having reviewed the file, heard arguments made by
the parties, and having fully considered the record in this
matter, and having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
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of Law,
HEREBY ORDERS THAT:
The final agency decision issued on May 8, 1997 is affirmed.
Petitioner's right to access the courts was not violated.

A

judgment is entered in favor of the the State of Utah, Office of
Recovery Services and against Petitioner for $726.00 for an
overpayment of general assistance during the time period he was
ineligible to receive that assistance from August 1994 to
October, 1994.

Said judgment shall accrue at the judgment rate

of interest.
DATED this

\1

day of

\|^ M

^ — . 1998.

PARLEY R. BALDWIN
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Michael E. Bulson
Attorney for Petitioner

124

Stephanie M. Saperstein (#5541)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (#1231)
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for the State of Utah
515 East 100 South, Eighth Floor
P.O. Box 140835
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0835
Telephone: (801) 536-8358
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
T. TRON BURGUNDY aka Ronald
G. Smith
Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.
STATE OF UTAH, Department
of Human Services, Office of
Recovery Services

Case No. 970903742AA
Judge Parley R. Baldwin

Respondent.

The foregoing matter came before the court for trial on
December 18, 1997 on Petitioner's complaint for de novo review of
the Findings and Order issued by the Department of Human
Services, Office of Administrative Hearings on May 8, 1997.
Honorable Parley R. Baldwin presided.

The

The petitioner, T. Tron

Burgundy was represented by Michael E. Bulson.

The Respondent

State of Utah was represented by Frank D. Mylar, Assistant
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Attorney General.

At the hearing, the Court accepted the

Stipulation of Material Facts executed and filed by the parties.
Petitioner submitted an Affidavit with his Reply to Trial Brief
filed with the permission of the court after the trial.
The Court having reviewed the file, heard the arguments of
the parties and having fully considered the record in this matter
enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
Pursuant to the stipulation of material facts submitted by
the parties, the court finds that:
1.

Petitioner T. Tron Burgundy began receiving General

Welfare Assistance (GA) from the State of Utah in May, 1994,
based upon a determination that he was unemployable.
2.

On June, 7, 1994, while receiving GA benefits,

Petitioner applied for disability benefits under the federal
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) programs.
3.

On July 21, 1994, Petitioner received notice from the

Ogden Office of Family Support that he was no longer considered
unemployable and that his GA would terminate on July 31, 1994.

2
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4.

On or about August 1, 1994, Petitioner requested a Fair

Hearing on the decision to terminate his benefits and he
requested that his GA benefits continue while his hearing request
was pending.
5.

On August 16, 1994, Petitioner's case was heard before

Fair Hearing Officer Neal Bernson.

At this hearing, Petitioner

had the opportunity to submit evidence, question and call
witnesses, present argument, and be represented by counsel.
6.

On October 6, 1994, the Fair Hearing Officer issued a

decision sustaining the closure of Petitioner's GA case.
7.

Petitioner requested a review of the Fair Hearing

Officer's decision.
8.

On or about January 6, 1995, the Director of the

Office of Administrative Hearing closed the record of review on
the Fair Hearing decision after receiving memoranda from all
parties.
9.

On April 1, 1995, the Office cf Recovery Services

served a Notice of Agency Action: Overpayment Determination
(NAA:OD) on Petitioner, alleging an overpayment in the amount of
$726.00 for GA benefits paid while his Fair Hearing decision was
pending.

3
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10.

Petitioner timely requested a review of this agency

action on April 6, 1995.

However, that hearing was stayed until

the final agency action on the eligibility appeal was rendered.
11.

On July 20, 1995, Petitioner was found by the Social

Security Administration to be disabled under the SSDI and SSI
programs, with the disability commencing in September, 1993.
12.

On November 12, 1996, the Director of the Office of

Administrative Hearings affirmed the Fair Hearing Officer's
eligibility decision finding petitioner not eligible for GA
benefits.
13.

Petitioner did not appeal this eligibility decision.
On March 10, 1997, a hearing was held before an

Administrative Law Judge on the overpayment alleged in the
NAA:OD.
14.

On May 8, 1997, the Administrative Law Judge issued

her final agency decision on the overpayment determination.
As allowed by the court the following facts were submitted
to the court in Petitioner's Affidavit attached to his Response
to Defendant's Trial Brief:
15.

In July 1994, Petitioner was 56 years of age and was

suffering from physical and mental impairments.
16.

When he received a notice of termination of GA

4

benefits, petitioner was homeless, unable to work and had no
savings, assets or other means of support himself.
17.

At the time Petitioner requested a hearing on the

termination of his GA assistance, he believed he was entitled to
GA because he was disabled.
18.

Several months after being terminated from GA benefits,

petitioner reapplied for those benefits and was found eligible to
receive them.
19.

He continued to receive them until he became eligible

for Social Security Disability benefits.
Pursuant to the evidence presented at trial, the court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that:
20.

Petitioner was notified of the decision to terminate

his GA benefits.
21.

Petitioner requested a Fair Hearing on the decision

terminating his benefits.
22.

Petitioner elected to continue receiving GA until

after a decision was issued on the Fair Hearing.
23.

Petitioner was aware that if the decision from the

Fair Hearing was against him, he would subsequently be
responsible for the overpayment.

5
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Based on the above findings of fact, the Court* now makes its
conclusions of law:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The law requires the petitioner to repay the GA

benefits he received during the Fair Hearing hearing process if
he is unsuccessful at his hearing.

See 45 C.F.R.

§205.10(a)(4)(I)(B), Utah Code Ann. §62A-9-129 and Rule 8444(2)(A), Volume II of the Department of Human Services, Office of
Family Support (UTAH-D.H.S.-0.F.S., Vol. II).
2.

This law is not unconstitutional.

3.

Requiring Petitioner to repay any GA he received

during a period of ineligibility has no chilling effect on his
right to access to the court.
4.

The State has erected no barrier which caused

Petitioner to lose his right to access
5.

the court.

The right to access does not guarantee Petitioner that

he will prevail.
6.

Petitioner has the right to access the courts whether

or not he continues to receive GA during the hearing process.
7.

Petitioner's right to due process was not inhibited

6
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because he was able to exercise all of his procedural rights by
contesting the termination of his benefits.
8.

If Petitioner unsuccessfully contests his termination

of benefits and he elected to continue receiving GA during the
hearing process, then he is required to repay any general
assistance he received while ineligible from August, 1994 to
October, 1994.
9.

The final agency decision should be affirmed.

10.

Petitioner should pay to the State $726.00 for

general assistance he received during his period of ineligibilit

DATED this

13> day of

CLUJ^T^

, 1998.

PARLEY R. BALDWIN
DISTRICT COURT JUDGr
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
-*7x

.i

'?

Michael E. Bulson
Attorney for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, first-class postage
prepaid, this

day of

, 1998, to:

MICHAEL E. BULSON, ESQ.
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES
550 24TH STREET, SUITE 300
OGDEN, UT 84401

Barbara L. Huber
Paralegal
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Art. I, § 9

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

substantial evidence to support the charge and the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person
or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of
the court if released on bail.
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal
only as prescribed by law.
1988 (2nd S.S.)

Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.]
Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines shall not
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated
with unnecessary rigor.
1896
S e c . 10. [Trial by jury.]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate. In capital cases the jury shall consist of twelve
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of
no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature
shall establish the number ofjurors by statute, but in no event
shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases threefourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases
shall be waived unless demanded.
1996

Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is
a party.

1896

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the
n a t u r e and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed,
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed.
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary
examination, the function of that examination is limited to
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute
or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is
allowed as defined by statute or rule.
1994

Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment —
Grand jury.]
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be
waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by
indictment, with or without such examination and commitment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947
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Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated; and no w a r r a n t shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to
be seized.
i8%
Sec. 15. [Freedom of s p e e c h a n d of t h e p r e s s — Libel.]
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the
truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall
appear to the jury that the m a t t e r charged as libelous is true,
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends,
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right
to determine the law and the fact.
1896

Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.]
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of
absconding debtors.
1896

Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.]
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military,
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, may vote at their
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be
prescribed by law.
1896

Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing
contracts.]
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed.
1896

Sec. 19. [Treason denned — Proof.]
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on
the testimony of two witnesses to t h e same overt act.
1896

Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.]
The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil
power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in
any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war
except in a manner to be prescribed by law.
1896

Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.]
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime, whereof t h e party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within this State.
1896

Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.]
Private property shall not be t a k e n or damaged for public
use without just compensation.
1896

Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise,
privilege or immunity.
1896

Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general n a t u r e shall have uniform operation.
1896

Sec. 25. [Rights retained by people.]
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair
1896
or deny others retained by the people.

Sec. 26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.]
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be
1896
otherwise.
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^ u dication, narrow issues, and simplify the methods of proof
hearings
(3) Any rule made concerning proceedings before the
Workforce Appeals Board shall be made m consultation with
^ e Workforce Appeals Board
1996
at

35A'l-304. R e v i e w a u t h o r i t y of the Workforce Appeals
Board.
(1) (a) In accordance with this title and Title 63A, Chapter
46b, Administrative Procedures Act, the Workforce Appeals Board may allow an appeal from a decision of an
administrative law judge if a motion for review is filed
with the Division of Adjudication within the designated
time by any party entitled to the notice of the administrative law judge's decision
(b) An appeal filed by the party shall be allowed as of
right if the decision of the administrative law judge did
not affirm the department's prior decision
(c) If the Workforce Appeals Board denies an application for appeal from the decision of an administrative law
judge, the decision of the administrative law judge is
considered a decision of the Workforce Appeals Board for
purposes of judicial review and is subject to judicial
review if further appeal is initiated under this title
(2) On appeal, the Workforce Appeals Board may on the
basis of the evidence previously submitted m the case, or upon
the basis of any additional evidence it requires
(a) affirm the decision of the administrative law judge,
(b) modify the decision of the administrative law judge,
or
(c) reverse the findings, conclusions, and decision of the
administrative law judge
(3) The Workforce Appeals Board shall promptly notify the
parties to any proceedings before it of its decision, including
its findings and conclusions, and the decision is a final order of
the department unless within 30 days after the date the
decision of the Workforce Appeals Board is issued, further
appeal is initiated under this title
1998
35A-1-305. I n d e p e n d e n c e of Workforce Appeals Board.
A member of the Workforce Appeals Board may not participate in any case in which the member is an interested party
Each decision of a member of the Workforce Appeals Board
shall represent the member's independent judgment
1997
35A-1-306. E l e c t r o n i c or similar methods.
The department may by rule permit hearings or other
adjudicative hearings to be conducted, recorded, or published
by means of electronic devices or other similar methods
1996
35A-1-307. S c o p e of part.
This part does not apply to adjudication under
(1) Chapter 3, Employment Support Act, or
(2) Chapter 5, P a r t 1, Job Training Coordination Act
1997

PART 4
RESERVED
PART 5
ASSISTANCE FRAUD
35A-1-501. Legal r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of department.
At the request of the department, it is the duty of the county
attorney or district attorney, as appropriate under Sections
17-18-1, 17-18-1 5, and 17-18-1 7, and the attorney general to
represent the department in any legal action taken under
Chapter 3, Employment Support Act, or under Title 76
Chapter 8, P a r t 12, Public Assistance Fraud
1997

35A-1-502

35A-1-502. Civil liability for o v e r p a y m e n t .
(1) As used in this section
(a) "Intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly" mean the
same as those terms are defined m Section 76-2-103
(b) (1) "Overpayment" means money, public assistance,
or any other thing of value provided under a state or
federally funded benefit program to the extent t h a t
the person receiving the thing of value is not entitled
to receive it or is not entitled to receive it at the level
provided
(11) "Overpayment" includes money paid to a provider under this title in connection with public assistance, Title 62A, Chapter 11, Part 3, Public Support
of Children, Title 78, Chapter 45, Uniform Civil
Liability for Support Act, Title 78, Chapter 45a,
Uniform Act on Paternity, or any other publicly
funded assistance benefit program to the extent t h a t
the provider receives payment
(A) for goods or services not provided, or
(B) in excess of the amount to which the provider is entitled
(c) "Provider" means the same as that term is defined
in Section 62A-11-103
(2) Each provider, client, or other person who receives an
overpayment shall, regardless of fault, return the overpayment or repay its value to the department immediately
(a) upon receiving written notice of the overpayment
from the department, or
(b) upon discovering the overpayment, if t h a t occurs
prior to receiving notice
(3) (a) Except as provided under Subsection (3)(b), interest
on the unreturned balance of the overpayment shall
accrue at the rate of 10% a year until an administrative or
judicial judgment is entered
(b) If the overpayment was not the fault of the person
receiving it, that person is not liable for interest on the
unreturned balance
(c) In accordance with rules adopted by the department an overpayment may be recovered through deductions from cash assistance, general assistance, food
stamps, or other cash-related assistance provided to a
client under Chapter 3, Employment Support Act
(4) Each person who knowingly assists a client, provider, or
other person in obtaining an overpayment is jointly and
severally liable for the overpayment
(5) (a) In proving liability for overpayment under this
section or Subsection 62A-11-204 l(2)(a)(i) when fault is
alleged the department shall prove by clear and convincing evidence that the overpayment was obtained intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, by false statement, misrepresentation, impersonation, or other fraudulent means,
such as by committing any of the acts or omissions
described in Sections 76-8-1203 through 76-8-1205
(b) If fault is established under Subsection (5)(a), any
person who obtained or helped another obtain an overpayment shall be subject to
(I) a civil penalty of 10% of the amount of the
overpayment, and
(II) disqualification from receiving public assistance for 12 months for the first offense, 24 months
for the second offense, and permanently for the third
offense or as otherwise provided by federal law
(6) (a) If an action is filed, the department may recover, in
addition to the principal sum plus interest, reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs unless the repayment obligation
arose from an administrative error by the division
(b) Upon receipt, the department shall forward attorneys fees recovered under Subsection (6)(a) to the attor-
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When To Continue Assistance For a Recipient

190-2 When To Continue Assistance For A Recipient
1.

When the action in question required advance notice, continue the
financial assistance if the client asked for the hearing anytime before
the effective date of the action or within 10 days of the notice mail
date.
At the hearing, the Hearing Examiner will decide what the issues are.
If he says the only reason for the hearing is because of Federal or
State policy or law, stop the financial assistance at that time.
Otherwise, continue the financial assistance until you receive the
hearing decision.

2.

When the action in question did not require advance notice, the OFS
Associate Director decides about continued assistance. If he says
the only reason for the hearing is because of Federal or State policy
or law, do not issue continued assistance. However, if he says that
is not the only reason for the hearing, continue the financial
assistance if the client asked for the hearing within 10 days of the
notice mail date. You would then continue the financial assistance
until you get the hearing decision.

3.

If you continue the financial assistance when the hearing is because
the client does not agree with the amount of an overpayment,
continue the grant minus the recovery amount. However, if you
continue the financial assistance when the hearing is about whether
or not an overpayment exists in the first place, reinstate the original
grant amount.

4.

The client is not entitled to continued assistance pending any appeal
of the initial hearing decision.

(Continued on Next Page)
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PROGRAM STANDARDS - GASSP
Determination Of Employability
362-3 Determination of Emplovabilitv

A person must work less than 100 hours per month and must meet
one of the following three criteria:
1.

Unemployable, OR

2.

"Marginally employable" as determined by the district
director at his discretion, OR

3.

60 years of age or older.

362-3
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PROGRAM STANDARDS - GASSP
Unemployable

362-4 Unemployable
The applicant must provide medical evidence* that he is not
employable due to a physical or mental impairment. If the medical
statement does not provide medical evidence, offer to help the
client obtain medical evidence. Medical records or specialized
medical evaluations may provide medical evidence. The local
office has the responsibility to pay for medical exams to provide
evidence needed to determine eligibility. The exams must be prior
approved by the local office. The client is responsible for securing
medical records, contacting a specialist if needed, and scheduling
evaluations.
The impairment must be so severe that the person cannot do his
previous work. In addition, he could not reasonably hope to find
any other kind of "substantial work" considering his age, education,
and work experience. "Substantial work" is work which pays $500
or more a month.
If the applicant states he has a medical problem and cannot work,
either accept the medical/psychological evidence the client may
have or give him Form 20 Disability or Form 21 Medical Report to
be completed and returned. Use Form 20 Disability, if the client
might be eligible for D disability or SSI, or
Medical Evidence: A client saying he has a medical problem does not constitute
medical evidence. Medical evidence are signs and findings based on tests, x-rays,
observation, and other medical procedures. Signs are anatomical, physiological or
psychological abnormalities which can be observed with clinical techniques. For
psychiatric impairments, signs are medically demonstrable abnormalities of behavior,
affect, thought, memory, orientation and contact with reality. For example, a person
saying they are depressed is not medical evidence. Participation in mental health
programs, psychological tests, and observation of behavior are examples of medical
evidence.
(Continued on Next Page)
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RECORDS AND GRANT MANAGEMENT - INCORRECT PAYMENTS

840

Incorrect Payments
An incorrect payment occurs when a person either:
1.

Receives a payment he is not eligible for, or

2.

Receives a payment he is eligible for but in the wrong amount.

840-1

Causes of Incorrect Payments
All overpayments must be referred to ORS no matter what the
cause. However, ORS may treat the collection of an overpayment
differently depending on its cause. For example, ORS can collect
interest on an overpayment caused by intentional violation, but
not on one caused by administrative error.
1.

Administrative Error
Administrative errors are all mistakes made by state or local
office staff in computing payments or eligibility. They
include the local office or state staff:

2.

A.

Delaying action on a reported change.

B.

Making a math error.

C.

Completing forms incorrectly.

D.

Applying policy incorrectly.

Inadvertent Error
Inadvertent errors are mistakes made by the client or his
representative that are not intended. They include errors
that result from:

(Continued on next page)
840-1 Page 1
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RECORDS AND GRANT MANAGEMENT - INCORRECT PAYMENTS
Causes of Incorrect Payments

3.

A.

Not understanding instructions and forgetfulness;

B.

A change that is reported more than 10 days after
the change occurs by a client who had not received
an explanation of the reporting requirements.

Intentional Violation
Intentional violations are deliberate breaches of program
rules by the client or his representative. They include:
A.

Making false or misleading statements;

B.

Misrepresenting, concealing, or withholding facts;

C.

Posing as someone else;

D.

Not reporting the receipt of a financial assistance
payment that the individual know her was not
entitled to;

E.

Not reporting a change within 10 days after the
change occurs, and the client knew they were
supposed to report the change.

840-1 Page 2
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circumstances in the perticular case, an individual will be found
to IKWC been at fault in connection \/ith ;ui overpayment when an
incorrect payment resulted from one of tho following:
(CL) Failure to furnish information which the individual
knew or should have known was material;
(b) An incorrect statement made by the individual which
ho knew or should have Izr.ovn was incorrect (this includes
the individual's furnishing his opinion or conclusion \/hcn
he was asked for facts), or
(c) The individual did not return a paynsnt which he knew
or could have been expected to know was incorrect.
Section lil6.553 Of Social Security Administration Regulations Ho, 16 provides in
pertinent part, that recovery of an overpayment will defeat the purpose of title
XVI of the Act if such recovery would deprive tho individual of income-or
financial resources needed for ordinary end ncccsnnry living expenses.
Section hl6.1336(c) of Regulations No, 16 provides, in pertinent port, that
where advance written notice of intent to terminate payments is given, the
notice will allow 60 days to request appropriate appellate review and if the
appeal is requested within 10 days, the payment shall be continued until a
decision on such appeal is issued.
EVIDF31CK CONSIDFRKI)
The Appeals Council has carefully considered the testimony at the hearing, the
arguments made, and the exhibits of record.
EVALUATION OF TIE FVIDFNCF
The claimant, born on May 27, 1950, was converted from the California welfare
rolls and began receiving supplemental security income as a disabled individual
in January 197U. The Social Security Administration determined that the claimant
no longer met the disability requirements and advised him on February 10, 1976*
that his disability had ceased in November 197?, that he might Request a hearing
within 60 days, and that if he wished his prior payments continued until a
hearing decision wa3 made, lie had to request a hearing within 10 days. The
claimant did so> requesting a hearing on February ?$ , 1/7^. Fie received monthly
benefits under the' continuation of payment provision through July 1977.
The final decision of the Secretary on the issue of th" cessation of the claimant's
disability was the hearing decision dated September 29, 1977, finding that the
claimant's disability had ended in November 19 (S «'u-* that supplemental security
income payments should, and have been, terminated with the close of January 1976.
The claimant requested the Appeals Council to review that decision and the Council
denied his request on February 10, 197o. No civil action was filed.
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On February
overpayment
his current
1978, found

3, 1978, a Notice of Overpayment advised the claimant of the $5139.50
and of his right to waiver if he was not at: fault and could not meet
living expenses. A reconsideration determination dated August 10,
that recovery could not be waived indicating, in pertinent part, that:

A "with faultn determination, in this case, is not predicated on
the fact that the recipient availed himself to (sic) the option to
have payments continue through the pendancy (sic) of the appeal, but
rather because he understood the cause of the overpayment (the fact
that his eligibility ceased due to the cessation of his disabling
condition), and his awareness of the consequences of his actions,
and absent a showing to the contrary, under present administrative
procedures, Mr. Vaughn cannot be found to be without fault in
connection with the overpayment, and, as such, recovery of the
overpaid anount is required.
The administrative law judge's rationale in finding the claimant not without fault
was that the claimant understood from the notice he hid received that he might
have to repay if he lost his appeal; that he knew that the Administration had
found him no longer disabled; that, irrespective of his own opinion about his
disability, he knew he was receiving benefits under the risk of repayment; and
that he was capable of appreciating the difference between receiving benefits
when found disabled and receiving benefits after die Aiiministraticn found his
disability had ended.
After careful consideration of the issue presented in this case, the Appeals
Council is of the opinion that where an overpayment occurs as the result of the
continuation of payment provisions of section 416.1336(c), a finding of without
fault may still be made if there is no evidence establishing that the recipientdid not believe he properly deserved the incorrect payment. Tne mere fact that
a claimant signed a statement acknowledging possible liability for overpayment
would not be dispositive of the issue.
In the instant case, the entire overpayment resulted Iran the continuation of
payment provision exercised by the claimant as his due process right under
the regulations. Although the claimant may well have understood that the
Ajdministration no longer considered him disabled and that he could ultimately
lose on appeal, it is evident from the record that he honestly believed he was
disabled and properly deserved the payments trade after January 1976.
Therefore, the mere fact that a claimant realizes ho received an adverse disability
determination and that he might ultimately lose hi.:; appeal and be overpaid is not
determinative of the without fault issue. The kev factor is the claimant's
belief that he was disabled and that he properly deserved the payment. The record
in this case fully supports the claimant's good faith belief in his own disabled
condition and his honest belief that he properly deserved the payment. Tne fact
that he availed himself of the coiitinued payment procedures under the regulations
cannot Impute fault to him.

4
Moreover, it is clear under section 416.552 of the regulations that the claimant
did not fail to furnish information, did not irake any incorrect statement or
fail to return any payment which he knew was inroivct . Accordingly, he is not
at fault under section 416.552.
The Appeals Council is of the opinion, and finds, that the claimant was without
fault in connection with the $5139.50 overpayment for February 1976 through July
1977. In addition, it is evident from the record that the claimant has not had
appreciable savings in the past few years and required all of his income for his
ordinary and necessary living expenses. Accordingly, the Appeals Council finds
that recovery of the $5139.50 overpayment would defeat the purpose of title XVI
of the Social Security Act.
DECISION
The d e c i s i o n of the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e law judge i s r e v e r s e d . I t i s the d e c i s i o n
of the Appeals Council t h a t recovery of the $5139.50 overpayment i s v^iived.
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This case is before t h e Appeals Council on remand from the United States Cistr.ct
Court for the Eastern District of California (Civil Action \ ' o . CV
S-7Z-Wl-T3y).
The Appeals Council v a c a t e s its denial of the claimant's requcvt for review of
the hearing decision issued on March 11, 1977.
The s t a t e m e n t s of the administrative law judge as to tho pertinent provisions
of the Social Security A c t , the issues in the case, ana the evidentiary facts *hich
were before him a r e incorporated herein by reference, iiowever, the Appeals
Council does not adopt Lhe inferences, findings or conclusions of the administrative
law judge on the ultimate Lssue of t h e waiver or adjustment of recovery of the
overpayment of supplemental security income.
Social Security Regulations No, 16, Subpart E, section M6.35G provides that recovery
of the overpayment is applicable if an Individual was without fault in connection
with the overpayment and adjustment or recovery of tne overpayment v/oulo defeat
the purpose of title XVI. Regulations 416.552 and 416.553 contain the criteria
for determining whether an individual was "without fault" and vhether waiver
of adjustment or recovery of the overpayment wouH defeat t ie purpose of title

xvi.
After careful consideration of all the evidence of record, the Appeals C c r o l
finds t h a t the claimant was without fault in connection with the overpayment
of supplemental security income benefits because tne c v i c n c c co*2S not cstaolisi.
that the claimant knew or could have been expected to Lno\ that tne b o ^ f i t
oayments she elected to receive pending th^ hearing . o ^io » or the dis >i!'ty
issue were improper. In fact, the record reveals t ^ n t t i~ cw ;rr ?nt cloa, 1/ >ol:o». '
t h a t she was c o t m e d xo tne incorrect oayments. "!• " oi, *ol I'SO n i - ' : t n i t " -jj^tment
or recovery of the overpayment would defeat the o n » w . f : tic > v'i.
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The decblon of the administrative law judge Issued on January 27, 1978, is reversed.
It is the decision of the Appeals Council that the overpayment of supplemental
security income to the claimant during the period November 1976 through March
1977 b waived.
APPEALS COUNCIL

Mrwin Friedcnberg, Member
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